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Abstract In this reply I try to show that, contrary to Milberry’s apparent assertion, the
general intellect of the multitude does not have the explanatory robustness she accredits to
it (following both Virno and the Hardt and Negri of the Empire trilogy). Digital network
technologies are currently overwhelmingly effective in proletarianizing and disempower-
ing the cognitariat and only an active technopolitics of deproletarianization could reverse
this hegemonic situation. In my response to Verbeek, I attempt to correct his misinter-
pretation (shared by Milberry) of the Stieglerian approach as being dialectical in nature and
show that, far from reinstating the humanist dichotomy between human beings and tech-
nologies, my analysis assumes their original, albeit fundamentally ambiguous and even
‘uncanny’ [unheimlich] interconnection. I conclude with pointing out some implications of
this view for a ‘really realistic’ political theory of technology.
Keywords Digital technologies  Technical condition  General intellect  Post-
phenomenology  Dialectics  Politics of technology
First of all I want to thank both commentators for taking the time and the effort to write
their thoughtful and carefully composed responses to my article. Both are very much
appreciated.
I’ll start off my reply with Milberry’s response, which seems most sympathetic to the
overall argument and general philosophical and political approach of the article, and
mostly offers affirmative comments, yet also presents some critical remarks. Before that,
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however, I feel compelled to correct two apparent misunderstandings. First, although I
largely approve of Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, my notions of ambivalence
and creative appropriation are adapted from Stiegler and not taken from Feenberg, and are
as such based on the former’s pharmacological conception of technology, which certainly
has some affinities with Feenberg’s ambivalence theory but, as I write in the article, is
rooted in an elaborate ‘onto-anthropological’ and ‘onto-anthropogenetic’ understanding of
the human life form as a technical life form, one that is lacking in Feenberg and that fully
explains why and how technologies are fundamentally and irreducibly ambivalent and in
constant need of creative (re)appropriation (or ‘adoption’ in Stiegler’s terminology).
Second, the pharmacological approach to technology and technological change is decidely
not dialectical, as Milberry repeatedly yet erroneously infers. But I’ll come back to this in
my reply to Verbeek, who shares this misunderstanding.
Referring to both Virno and Hardt and Negri, Milberry argues that the concept of the
general intellect, indeed central to my article, may have more explanatory robustness than I
acknowledge. Presuming this to mean that it crucially explains the growing revolutionary
potential of the multitude under current circumstances of immaterial labor, I must reiterate
that I find this unconvincing, both empirically and conceptually, at least when this is taken
in the sense that it ‘automatically’, as it were, grants labor more autonomy and thus yields
it more powerful and assertive vis-a`-vis capital. The proletarianizing efficacy of the digital
network technologies (DNTs) underpinning the ‘communism of capital’ currently far
outweighs their empowering functionality, as a vast and growing body of empirically based
literature attests (to mention just a few: Carr 2010, 2015; Crary 2013; Keen 2015;
McChesney 2013; Pariser 2011; Rouvroy and Berns 2013) and only a (bottom-up) tech-
nopolitics of deproletarianization oriented towards a positive pharmacology—which
entails more than simply ‘commonization’—could bring about a turn in this hegemonic
tendency.
Of course, this is not the whole story and in particular Berardi’s diagnosis is fairly
reductionist, I readily admit, yet it adequately describes certain dominant trends in the
working conditions of today’s cognitariat, resonating for instance with Jonathan Crary’s
descriptions of 24/7 capitalism (Crary 2013) and the analyses of communicative capital-
ism’s proletarianizing capture of the libidinal energies of workers and consumers via the
digital networks by Jodi Dean, who emphasizes the depoliticizing character of those
networks, as they systematically distract subjects from engagement in real political action
by soliciting them continuously to online pseudo-activity (Dean 2010). As a matter of fact,
for Dean, as an active participant in it, Occupy’s success (like that of the other revolts of
2011) should not so much be explained from the political blessings of new social media,
but from ‘the physical amassing of people outside’ (Dean 2012, 216). Even Hardt and
Negri most recently have recognized the largely disempowering effects of digital media on
the thoroughly ‘mediated subjects’ of contemporary capitalism, constantly absorbed as
they are in attentional cycles fragmenting their psyches and eroding their (in particular
political) affects. Echoing Dean, they write: ‘Facebook, Twitter, the Internet and other
kinds of communications mechanisms are useful, but nothing can replace the being
together of bodies and the corporeal communication that is the basis of collective political
intelligence and action’ (Hardt and Negri 2012, 18).
As for the call for democratic control of technology, which Milberry proposes as a
student of Feenberg: as I’ve tried to show in a recent article co-written with Mithun
Bantwal-Rao, Joost Jongerden and Guido Ruivenkamp, under capitalist conditions, the call
for democratization of technological innovation seems idle since it ‘remains severely
limited for the simple reason that there is no incentive for industry to engage in any
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significant democratization for any reason beyond that of the market […] or public
institutional force’ (Bantwal-Rao et al. 2015). Such a call only makes sense if combined
with a radical critique of the capitalist order, something that is conspicuously absent in
Feenberg’s later, watered-down (from too much wrong-headed concessions to STS, that is)
version of critical theory.
Milberry concludes her response with a remarkably idealist critique of my proposal for a
pharmacological (re)appropriation and redesign of our digital milieu, arguing that this
should be preceded by a change in our ‘social values and mores’ towards more ‘love’,
thereby apparently disregarding the ruining effects on self-love and the affective capacities
of individuals in general of the omnipresent apparatuses of libidinal capture and
exploitation that hegemonically constitute the current ‘sociotechnical foundation of con-
temporary life’ under capitalist conditions (Stiegler 2009; Berardi 2009). I very much agree
that love, also in its social form of philia (Aristotle), is key to a better society, but before
preaching love, we should—as good Marxists—first consider its current means and con-
ditions of production (or better: destruction) and then think of strategies to transform these.
I will now turn to Verbeek’s response, that is more critical about my general approach,
which is implicitly accused of being unrealistic (i.e., in its plea for a ‘realistic political
theory of technology’) for basically two reasons: (1) it is, apparently, not empirically
informed in that it disregards ‘actual technologies’ and only applies ‘pre-given philo-
sophical frameworks’ ‘from outside’ (that are even suggested to be obsolete) to a tech-
nological domain of ‘things themselves’ that are left uninvestigated (just like the
traditional, transcendentalist philosophers of technology did); and (2) it remains caught in a
dialectic of domination and liberation that is apparently also obsolete and unproductive and
should be replaced, or at least complemented, with a hermeneutic approach, present in the
allegedly dialectical approach of Stiegler (and obviously also Feenberg) but lacking in my
analysis. The ‘realistic’ alternative proposed is a more hermeneutic approach oriented
towards ‘the things themselves’, here understood not ‘in the phenomenological sense’ (as
Verbeek nonetheless claims) but empirically, in the way STS approaches technology—
surely neither Husserl nor Heidegger ever thought of ‘die Sachen selbst’ as concrete
objects; these were precisely ‘bracketed’ in order to attain the proper phenomenological
Sach-dimension: the acts of transcendental consciousness (like intentionality) for Husserl,
modes of being for Heidegger.
Before responding to these critiques, I again feel the need to first correct Verbeek’s (as
well as Milberry’s) misinterpretation of Stiegler’s (and my own) approach as being ‘di-
alectical’. To state it directly: Stiegler’s approach to technology is not dialectical. As
organological, it understands the human-technology-society relation with Simondon as
transductive (and thus not dialectic) in nature and with Nietzsche as traversed by com-
posing, rather than op-posing antagonistic tendencies; and in this sense Stiegler’s view is
close to that of post-autonomist Marxism (Bantwal-Rao et al. 2015). As pharmacological,
it simply cannot be dialectical because the pharmakon’s ‘negativity’ (its toxicity) can
never be ‘sublated’ (aufgehoben) as it persists as technical heteronomy and thus calls for an
on-going therapy (Stiegler 2015, 129). Explaining this first requires some comments on the
notion of the dialectic.
It is my impression that, for Verbeek, this notion only refers to the Marxist struggle of
oppression and resistance between labor and capital (as derived from Hegel’s master–slave
dialectic). At its origins in Hegel and Marx, however, the dialectic first of all describes the
historical process of human culture as a process of exteriorization, idealistically under-
stood in Hegel as the self-externalization and subsequent internalization of the spirit,
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materialistically in Marx as the self-production of the human species through its exter-
nalized means of production, i.e., technologies or technical organs.
Like Marx, Stiegler also thinks of human evolution and history as based in a process of
technical exteriorization (and interiorization). In contrast to Marx, however, who remains
an instrumentalist in apprehending technologies as means sovereignly determined by the
human subject, Stiegler conceives of technologies as constituting and conditioning the
human ‘subject’. Moreover, since technologies—as pharmaka compensating for man’s
‘original lack’—are not only curative but simultaneously and irreducibly toxic as well, i.e.,
heteronomizing, proletarianizing or disindividuating, no dialectial sublation and thus no
perfect interiorization is possible. What is more, the autonomy of ‘the interior’ (‘the
subject’, ‘the self’) remains forever dependent on exterior technical heteronomy: yes it is
constituted by it, but only after its adoption as the formation of individual or social
practices. For Stiegler, the ‘subjugating’ or ‘enslaving’ character of technology cannot be
explained solely (and instrumentally) on the basis of the class struggle, i.e., from the social
relations of production, as in Marxism. As a pharmakon, technology is originally prole-
tarianizing, but for the very same reason it is also the (only) route towards
deproletarianization.
In this regard, Verbeek is very right to point out that Stiegler provides ‘a fascinating
new turn’ to the Marxist dialectic (although it is not a dialectic anymore as should be clear
by now), in showing that ‘the struggle between humanity and technology is constitutive for
the human being’, although the term ‘struggle’ does not seem to be very appropriate for
what Stiegler theorizes as the human’s pharmacological relation with technology, in which
the latter both con-stitutes and de-stitutes the former. I do not believe I’m regressing
towards a traditional Marxist position in calling for the (re)appropriation of the digital
pharmaka to reconquer our collective autonomy vis-a`-vis capital, since this is not ‘a call to
take up arms against the technologies of capitalism’ but a call to fight capitalism with the
technologies ‘of capitalism’, but this attribution precisely becomes problematic of course
from a pharmacological perspective.
Far from reinstating a separation of human beings and technologies, as Verbeek claims
oddly enough, it is exactly a recognition of the need, the necessity, to reforge the phar-
makon—which is always and by its very ‘nature’ a weapon, as Stiegler rightly insists time
and again with reference to Deleuze—to regain social autonomy on the basis of the new
technical heteronomy that the digital pharmaka, which are indeed not ‘mere vehicles of
capitalism’, represent. True enough, whereas Stiegler only calls for a struggle against
today’s capitalism’s proletarianizing and heteronomizing tendencies, I firmly side with the
post-autonomists in calling for a technical fight against capitalism as such. In that sense, I
advocate the challenge of ‘pre-given frameworks’ on the basis of ‘concrete technologies’
(‘from within’ if you like), as Verbeek suggests I should do, fully convinced that it is
precisely technology in its very concreteness that represents the domain of the (empirical-
accidental) transcendental because it is technologies, first of all mnemotechnologies like
writing, printing and digital computing of course, that constitute and condition the pos-
sibilities of human thought, knowledge and critique in general, but to explain this would
take too much space here (as would the plea for the necessity of a ‘transcendental (re)turn’
in philosophy of technology to make it properly philosophical again and rescue it from its
myopic fascination with empirically describing the effects of the most recent techno-
commodities on a consumber-subject that is not in any way problematized, and neither is
their nature as productive of that subject).
That digital technologies ‘can also be the source of new forms of social agency and self-
awareness’ is thus exactly what I claim, and also that ‘technologies are not opposed to
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politics’, precisely because ‘they are its very media’ (although I would prefer to say that
they completely re-constitute and re-condition political action and even the political as
such in our epoch): what could be more proof of ‘a realistic recognition of the techno-
logical condition of human existence’ than emphasizing that these technologies constitute a
new political organology that has yet to be appropriated politically? It is precisely this new
(digital) organological configuration that forms ‘the ecostructure in which we inevitably
live our lives’, but as a fundamentally pharmacological milieu it is a battlefield as well as
an arsenal that allows for a struggle—that is what politics is—against a destructive and
utterly nihilistic capitalism that has for too long now claimed that it is ‘inevitable’ and
without alternative (and about which postphenomenology remains totally silent).
It is true that there are no ‘close analyses of the technological things themselves’ in my
article, but I do provide a description of the general characteristics of DNTs that make
them ideally suited for the invention of an alternative, post-capitalist economy. Of course,
empirical analysis always remains important in philosophy of technology, but analyzing
technologies in complete abstraction from the politico-economic conjuncture in which
they appear and operate, as postphenomenology usually does, is also pretty unrealistic in
my view. Apart from that, and notwithstanding some notable exceptions (e.g. Van Den
Eede 2012), one does not find that much analysis of (new) media, and neither a dialogue
with media theory, in postphenomenology, which is strange for a philosophy that explicitly
theorizes technological mediation.
Also, a philosophy of technology that has no eye for the libidinal aspects of technology
(and technical artifactuality is precisely that which ‘mediates’ human affectivity and
renders it different from the instinctual behavior of animals), and even questions the
usefulness of the libidinal perspective, as Verbeeks seems to do, may lose sight of a
significant ‘reality’-dimension of technology: that of the affective-phantasmatic. And a
fortiori a ‘political theory of technology’ should take account of this, if it is true that
political action and communication is about directing collective investment of desire. Both
postphenomenology and critical theory of technology could profit in that regard from an
engagement with psychoanalysis, of course based on an awareness of the thoroughly
technologically conditioned ‘nature’ of the human psyche, its affects and its capacities.
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